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Abstract. In this paper, a relation between shadow price and the Lagrangian multiplier
for nonsmooth problem is explored. It is shown that the Lagrangian Multiplier is the upper
bound of shadow price for convex optimization and a class of Lipschtzian optimizations.
This work can be used in shadow pricing for nonsmooth situation. The several nonsmooth
functions involved in this class of Lipschtzian optimizations is listed. Finally, an
application to electricity pricing is discussed.
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1. Introduction
Shadow price is the estimated price of a good or service for which no market price exists. It
is denoted as the infinitesimal change in the social benefit or social cost arising from an
infinitesimal change in the resources constraint. In other words, shadow price is the marginal
benefit or the marginal cost. From the perspective of constrained optimization, shadow price is
the change, per infinitesimal unit of the constraint, in the optimal value of the objective
function of an optimization problem obtained by relaxing the constraint. If the objective
function is benefit (cost), it is the marginal benefit (cost) of relaxing the constraint.
Shadow price was initially proposed by Tinbergen in 1930s in term of microeconomics, see
Nicholson and Snyder (2011). Then, it was shown that shadow price is equal to the value of the
Lagrangian multiplier at the optimal solution by Kantorovich, see Kantorovich (1965). The
relation between shadow price and the Lagrangian multiplier is a significant milestone in
shadow price topic. That paves a way for us to investigate shadow price both analytically and
computationally in real applications.
By the Lagrangian multiplier method, linear problem was initially investigated, duality
linear programming was used to analyze and compute shadow price. Then, convex problem
was studied, since under some mild condition, for instance Slater’s condition, a convex
optimization is equivalent to its duality problem, thus shadow price can be analyzed and
computed by a dual optimization problem, see Bertsekas (2003) and Boyd, Vandenberghe
(2004).
As a powerful technique, shadow pricing is widely used in cost-benefit analyses, for
instance, evaluating public projects, determine price of public goods. Since the importance of
environmental problems and resource allocation issues appears, recently shadow pricing has
been used in the area of energy economy by Lee and Zhou (2015), resource pricing by Col et al
(2017) and decision-making analysis by Ke et al (2016).
The social welfare maximization mode is widely used for energy pricing. In that model, the
objective function is usually the sum of utility functions of consumers minus the cost of the
2consumed energy. According to microeconomics, a utility function is increasing and concave.
In some application, cost functions are increasing and convex. Therefore, the social welfare
maximization is usually a convex optimization problem. Thus, shadow pricing can be
formulated as minimizing a convex function (as cost) or maximizing a concave function (as
benefit) with some constraints, which express resource limitation. The dual methods are used
to solve these optimization problems since dual methods can find not only decision variables
but also the Lagrangian multipliers, see Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004).
In the social welfare maximization for electricity pricing, utility functions and cost
functions are usually chosen as quadratic functions, see Deng et al (2015). As we know, the
utility function is a measure of the requirements and desires of an individual based on the
consumption or leisure activities. Generally speaking, a quadratic function or a smooth
function cannot characterize the benefit of an individual exactly. On the other hand, according
to approximation theory, a given continuous function can be approximated by a piecewise
linear function as close as we want, therefore it is good way to take a piecewise linear function
as a utility function. Unfortunately, piecewise linear functions are not smooth and it is not sure
whether the Lagrangian multiplier of social welfare maximization problem, which nonsmooth
functions are involved in, is shadow price. Therefore, we cannot choose a piecewise linear
function as well as some piecewise smooth function as a utility function.
The relation between shadow price and the Lagrangian multiplier is mainly concerned with
smooth situation. How to characterize shadow price by the Lagrangian multiplier for
nonsmooth situation, there exist no publications to deal with this problem prehensively. As
known, shadow price is the limitation of the quotient of the difference of objective function at
an optimal solution and constraint change of the optimization problem. For the smooth case,
the quotient of the difference of objective function can be expressed by its gradient, therefore
the limitation of the quotient exists, and is just the Lagrangian multiplier. For the nonsmooth
case, the quotient of the difference of objective function at optimal solution and constraint
change has multiple limitations generally, this leads to that shadow price is not a number. In
this paper, we explore the relation between shadow price and the Lagrangian multiplier for
nonsmooth situation. We give an upper bound of shadow price by Lagrangian multiplier for
nonsmooth situation. In the context of this study, we consider that objective functions are a
convex function and a class of Lipschitzian functions, respectively. While we consider that the
constraint functions to be smooth since constraints express the capacity of the resources, which
is usually smooth and sometimes are linear.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, some notions on
nonsmooth analysis and optimization are reviewed. In Section 3, shadow price characterized
by the Lagrangian multiplier is developed. In Section 4, some nonsmooth functions are
discussed. In Section 5, shadow pricing for electricity market is discussed.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we review some notions of nonsmooth analysis and the Lagrangian
3multiplier for nonsmooth optimization.
Definition 1 [see Bertsekas (2003)]. Let : R Rnf  be convex. The subdifferential of f at
x , denoted by )(xf ，is defined as the following:
T( ) { R | ( ) ( ) ( ), R }n nf x f y f x y x y         ,
)(xf is said to be an element of the subdifferential or a subgradient of f at x．
A convex function is directionally differentiable, according to Bertsekas (2003), its
sudifferential and directional derivative have the following relation:
T
( )
( ; ) max , R n
f x
f x d d d     .
: R Rnf  is said to be locally Lipschzian if there exists a neighbourhood ( )N x of x
and a constant L such that
1 2 1 2 1 2| ( ) ( ) | || ||, , ( )f x f x L x x x x N x     .
Definition 2 [see Clarke et al (1998)]. Let : R Rnf  be locally Lipschzian. The
generalized directional derivative, in the sense of Clarke, of f at x with respective to the
direction d , denoted by ( ; )f x d ，is defined as the following:
0
( ) ( )
( ; ) lim sup
y x
t
f y td f y
f x d
t
  ．
Although the generalized directional derivative does not equal to the directional derivative
generally, however it is greater than the directional derivative if the directional derivative
exists, i.e.,
( ; ) ( ; ), R nf x d f x d d  o .
Definition 3 [see Clarke et al (1998)]. Let : R Rnf  be locally Lipschzian. The generalized
gradient, in the sense of Clarke, of f at x , denoted by )(xf or Cl ( )f x ，is defined as
the following:
Cl ( ) { R | ( ; ) , R }
n nf x f x d d d        ,
Cl ( )f x  is said to be an element of the generalized gradient, also a generalized gradient,
of f at x．
Similarly to the convex situation, by Clarke et al (1998) the generalized directional
derivative can be reformulated as the following:
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T
( )
( ; ) max , R n
f x
f x d d d   o .
If we treat a convex function as a locally Lipschzian function, its generalized directional
derivative and generalized gradient happen to be the directional derivative and the
subdifferential, respectively.
Let us consider the optimization problem:
min ( )f x （1）
s.t.  ( ) 0, 1,..., ,ig x i m 
where f , , 1,...,ig i m are functions defined on R n , not necessary smooth．
If f , , 1,...,ig i m are continuously differentiable and *x is a solution of the problem
(1), under some conditions, for instance Slater’s condition, there exist scalars 1,..., 0m  
such that
* *
1
( ) ( ) 0
m
i i
i
f x g x

    , （2a）
*( ) 0i ig x  , （2b）
where 1,..., m  are called the Lagrangian multipliers of (1), see Bazaraa et al (1993).
In Problem (1), if the objective function f represents the cost of an economic system,
and , 1,...,ig i m represent the constraints of the supplement of resources, then the
Lagrangian multipliers 1,..., m  , in the sense of microeconomic, equal to shadow prices.
If f , , 1,...,ig i m are nonsmooth and *x is a solution of Problem (1), under some
condition, there exist scalars 1,..., 0m   such that
* *
1
0 ( ) ( )
m
i i
i
f x g x

   ， （3a）
*( ) 0, 1,...,i ig x i m   , （3b）
where  is a kind subdifferential of f , for instance the subdifferential in sense of
convex analysis，see Bertsekas (2003), Rockafellar et al (1998) and the generalized gradient,
see Clarke et al (1998), 1,..., 0m   are said to be Lagrangian multipliers also. In the
nonsmooth case, the above Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition is an inclusion, not an equality.
53. Shadow Price Characterized by the Lagrangian Multiplier
In this section, we will interpret that the relation between shadow price and the Lagrangian
multiplier for nonsmooth situation.
3.1. Propositions and Models
We start with several propositions, which will be used later on.
Proposition 1 [see Demyanov et al (1995), Gao (2018)]. If : R Rnf  is locally Lipschitzian
and directionally differentiable，it holds that
( ) ( ) ( ; ) (|| ||)f x d f x f x d o d    . (4)
Proposition 2. Let : R Rnf  and : R R, 1,...,nig i m  be convex. If there exist scalars
1,..., 0m   such that (3a) holds, then
* *
1
0 ( ; ) ( ; ), R
m
n
i i
i
f x d g x d d

     . (5)
Proof. Based on convex analysis and (3a), we have
* *
1
T
( ) ( )
0 max
m
i i
i
f x g x
d
 


  


,
* *
T T
( ) ( )1
max max
i
m
i
f x g xi
d d

  
 
 
* *
1
( ; ) ( ; ), R
m
n
i i
i
f x d g x d d

     .
This yields (5). 
Proposition 3. Let : R Rnf  and : R R, 1,...,nig i m  be locally Lipschtzian. If there
exist scalars 1,..., 0m   such that (3a）holds, where  denotes the generalized gradient of a
locally Lipschitzian function, then
* *
1
0 ( ; ) ( ; ), R
m
n
i i
i
f x d g x d d

   o o . (6)
Proof. Noticing
Cl
T
( )
( ; ) max
f x
f x d d o , the proof is similar to the proof in Proposition 2. 
From the perspective of applications, to interpret the relation between shadow price and
Lagrangian multiplier for nonsmooth optimization, we consider the case where constraints are
smooth. Since only first-order rate of change for the constraint is involved, same to Bertsekas
(2003), it is enough to consider the linearly constrained optimization problem.
We will discuss the one constraint case and multiple constraints case separately. Let us
consider the nonsmooth optimization problems as follows:
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min ( )
 s.t. 
f x
a x b (7)
and
T
min ( )
 s.t. , 1,..., ,i i
f x
a x b i m  (8)
where f is function (not necessary smooth) defined on R n , , R , 1,...,nia a i m  ,
, , 1,...,ib b i m are numbers.
We suppose that the function f is the cost of an economic system in both (7) and (8).
Ta x b denotes the resource limitation, in view of applications, we suppose that all
components of a are nonnegative and at least one component of a is nonzero in the
problem (7). Ti ia x b denotes the limitation of thi resource, we suppose that all components
of ia are nonnegative and at least one component of ia is nonzero in the problem (8).
3.2. Convex Case
Suppose that the function f is convex, *x is a minimizer and 0  is a Lagrangian
multiplier of Problem (7). Then, one has that
*0 ( )f x a  ,
T *( ) 0a x b   .
If the level of the constraint b is changed to b b  , then the minimizer will change to
*x x . Since shadow price is just to evaluate scarce resource, we suppose that T * 0a x b  ,
otherwise shadow price is zero. By deducing, we have that
T * T * T T( )b b a x x a x a x b a x           ,
thus Tb a x   . Since convex function is locally Lipschitzian, by virtue of Propositions 1 and
2, setting T( )g x a x b  in Proposition 2, we deduce the corresponding change of the
objective function:
* * *= ( ) ( ) ( ; ) (|| ||)f f x x f x f x x o x       
*( ; ) (|| ||)g x x o x     
T (|| ||)a x o x     , (9)
Noticing Tb a x   , it is obtained that
(|| ||)f b o x      .
Since all components of a are nonnegative and at least one component of a is nonzero, we
have that
7(1)
f
o
b
   . (10)
The inequality (10) implies that the Lagrangian multiplier gives the maximum rate of optimal
value decrease over the level of constraint increase. In other worlds, a Lagrangian multiplier is
an upper bound of shadow price.
Any Lagrangian multiplier is an upper bound of shadow price, it is a good way to take the
minimum Lagrangian multiplier as an upper of shadow price.
We next discuss the case with multiple constraints. Suppose that *x is a minimizer,
1,..., 0m   is a set of Lagrangian multipliers for Problem (8). Then, one has that
* T
1
0 ( )
m
i i
i
f x a

  ,
T *( ) 0, 1,...,i i ia x b i m    .
Without loss of generality, we suppose that
T * 0, 1,...,i ia x b i m   ,
otherwise if there exists an index i such that T * 0i ia x b  , then its corresponding Lagrangian
multiplier is zero, so is shadow price. We further suppose that 1,..., ma a are linearly
independent. Therefore, the linear system
T , 1,...,i i ia x b b i m  
has a solution *x x for any set of changes ib of ib for 1,...,i m . The function f is
locally Lipschitzian, by virtue of Propositions 1 and 2, setting T( )i i ig x a x b  in Proposition
2, it follows that
* *= ( ) ( )f f x x f x  
*( ; ) (|| ||)f x x o x   
*
1
( ; ) (|| ||)
m
i i
i
g x x o x

    
T
1
(|| ||)
m
i i
i
a x o x

     .
Since T , 1,...,i ia x b i m    , one have that
1
(|| ||)
m
i i
i
f b o x

      . (11)
This means that a set of Lagrangian multipliers gives a maximum rate of optimal value
decrease over the level of constraints increase, specifically speaking i is a upper bound of
8shadow price for i th resource.
Different from the smooth problem, the nonsmooth problems does not admit unique
shadow price, this is due to the intrinsic feature of nonsmoothness.
Example 1. Let
2 , 0,
min ( )
, 0,
 s.t. 0.
x x
f x
x x
x
  
 
Evidently, * 0x  is a solution of the above problem. Noticing (0) [1,2]f  , a Lagrangian
multiplier  satisfies 0 [1,2]  , this implies 1 2  . Thus 1  is the minimum
Lagrangian multiplier and is also an upper bound.
3.2. Nonconvex Case
For the nonconvex case, we consider a class of Lipschitzian functions, which includes
maximum functions and some other nonsmooth functions. In Problem (7), we suppose that f
is Lipschitzian, directionally differentiable and its generalized directive and directive coincide,
i.e. ( ; ) ( ; ), R nf x d f x d d  o . Suppose that *x is a minimizer and 0  is a
Lagrangian multiplier of the problem (7). Then, we have that
*
Cl0 ( )f x a  ,
T *( ) 0a x b   .
If the level of the constraint b is changed to b b  , then the minimizer will change to
*x x . Same to the argument on the convex case, it follows Tb a x   . According to
( ; ) ( ; )f x d f x do , Propositions 1 and 3, setting T( )g x a x b  in Proposition 2, we deduce
the corresponding change of the objective function:
* *= ( ) ( )f f x x f x  
*( ; ) (|| ||)f x x o x   
*( ; ) (|| ||)f x x o x   o
*( ; ) (|| ||)g x x o x    o
*( ; ) (|| ||)g x x o x     
T (|| ||)a x o x     .
According to Tb a x   , we obtain that
(1)
f
o
b
   .
9That is to say a Lagrangian multiplier is a maximum rate of optimal value decrease over
the level of constraint increase.
If f is Lipschitzian, directionally differentiable and its generalized directive and directive
coincide, *x is a minimizer, 1,..., 0m   is a set of Lagrangian multipliers for Problem (8),
furthermore suppose that 1,..., ma a are linearly independent, similar to the argument on the
convex case, we can obtain that
1
(|| ||)
m
i i
i
f b o x

      . (12)
The inequality (12) means that the Lagrangian multipliers give the maximum rate of optimal
value decrease over the level of constraints increase, i is the upper bound of shadow price
for the i th resource.
4. Some Nonsmooth Functions
In the above sections, a class of locally Lipschitzian functions is involved in the discussion
on shadow price. In this section, we will list some nonsmooth functions which belong to that
class. The discuss will show that the function class is rather broad in some sense.
4.1. AMaximum Function
Suppose that : R R, 1,...,nif i m  are continuously differentiable. Let us consider the
following maximum function:
1
( ) max ( )i
i m
F x f x
 
 . (13)
Evidently, the function F is locally Lipschitzian and piecewise smooth. The problem of
minimizing
1
max ( )i
i m
f x
 
, i.e.,
1R
min max ( )
n ii mx
f x
 
, which is called the minimax problem, plays an
important role in nonsmooth optimization.
For a fixed point R nx , define the following index set:
( ) { {1,..., } | ( ) ( )}iI x i m f x f x   .
By virtue of Clarke et al (1998) and Gao (2018), the generalized gradient of F at x has of
the form:
Cl ( ) co{ ( ) | ( )}iF x f x i I x    .
Moreover, ( ; ) ( ; ), R nF x d F x d d  o , i.e., the generalized directional directive and the
directive of F coincide.
4.2. A Smooth Composition of Maximum Functions
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Let us consider smooth composition of maximum functions of the form:
1
1( ) (max ( ), ,max ( ))
m
j mj
j J j J
G x g f x f x
 
  , (14)
where : R R, , 1,...,nij if j J i m   and : R Rmg  are continuously differentiable,
, 1,...,iJ i m are finite index sets. It is easy to see that the function G is locally Lipschitzian
and piecewise smooth. The function F given in (13) is a special case of the function G . For
a fixed point R nx , denote the index sets:
( ) { | ( ) max ( )}, 1,...,
i
i i ij ik
k J
J x j J f x f x i m

    .
We suppose that the function g is increasing with respect to each variable, in other words,
1( , , ) 0, 1,...,m
i
g y y
i m
y
  

.
From Demyanov et al (1995), it follows that the generalized gradient of G at x has of the
form:
1
Cl
( )
( , , )
( ) { R | ( ), ( )}n m ij i
i I x i
g y y
G x f x j J x
y
 

       ,
moreover ( ; ) ( ; ), R nG x d G x d d  o , i.e., the generalized directional directive and the
directive of G coincide.
4.3. A Univariate Piecewise Smooth Function
We consider a piecewise smooth univariate function, which is useful in some pricing
mechanisms based on social welfare maximization. Suppose that
1, 0, 1, 2,...i ia a i    ,
: R R, 0, 1, 2,...if i    are continuously differentiable with
1( ) ( ),  0, 1, 2,...i i i if a f a i     ,
A univariate piecewise smooth function can be formulated as the following form:
1( ) ( ), [ , ),  0, 1, 2,...i i iH x f x x a a i     . (15)
Evidently, the function H is continuously differentiable except at , 0, 1, 2,...ia i    . We
suppose that
1( ) ( ),  0, 1, 2,...i i i if a f a i     . (16)
It can be verified that ( ; ) ( ; ), 1i iH a d H a d d  o if (16) is satisfied. This entails that
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( ; ) ( ; ), Ri iH a d H a d d  o since there exist just two directions 1d   on R . It is easy
to see that (16) holds if the function H is convex. The condition 1( ) ( )i i i if a f a  implies
that H behaves like a convex function at points , 0, 1, 2,...ia i    .
5. Pricing Mechanism Based on Social Welfare Maximization
The social welfare maximization is widely used for shadow pricing in some fields, for
instance energy and environment. Recently, the real-time pricing method based social welfare
maximization have been widely studied, see Deng et al (2015) and references therein.
We consider an electric power system that consists of an energy provider and k load
users. The energy provider and all users are connected with each other through an information
communication infrastructure. Suppose that ix denotes the power consumption, iU denotes
the utility function of the user i , C denotes the cost function for the provider and L
denotes the generating capacity of the electricity. The social welfare maximization model is as
the following:
1 1
1
max ( ) ( )
 s.t. 
k k
i i i
i i
k
i
i
U x C x
x L
 



 

(17)
where 1R , 1, ,ix i k  K are variables, see Deng et al (2015). The dual methods are used to
solve the problem (17), the dual variable is just the Lagrangian multiplier, i.e., shadow price.
According to microeconomics, a utility function is increasing and concave. The cost function is
increasing and convex sometime, thus the problem (17) is a convex optimization. Generally,
the electricity pricing can be formulated as minimizing a convex function or maximizing a
concave function with some constraints, which express resource limitation.
Usually, quadratic functions are chosen as utility functions for the problem (17), see Deng,
et al (2015). As we know, a utility is a measure of the requirements and desires for an
individual based on the consumption or leisure activities. Generally speaking, a quadratic
function or a smooth function cannot characterize a utility perfectly. By the mathematical
theory, piecewise linear function can approximate any function, therefore it is good way to
express utility by a piecewise linear function, or a piecewise smooth function for more accurate.
Noticing that a utility function is with a univariate, the function H given in (15) could be
taken as a utility function.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, the relation between shadow prices and the Lagrangian multipliers for
nonsmooth problem is developed. Except theoretical meaning, based on this work, finding a
12
upper bound of shadow price could be transformed into computing Lagrangian multipliers for
nonsmooth situation.
References
Bazaraa MS, Sherali HD, Shett CM (1993) Nonlinear Programming Theory and Algorithms
(John Wiley and Sons, New York).
Bertsekas DP (2003) Convex Analysis and Optimization (Athena Scientific, Belmont).
Boyd S, Vandenberghe L (2004) Convex Optimization (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge).
Clarke FH, Leda Yu S, Stern RJ, Wolenski PR (1998) Nonsmooth Analysis and Control
Theory (Springer-Verlag, New York).
Col B, Durnev A, Molchanov A (2017) Foreign risk, domestic problem: capital allocation and
firm performance under political instability, Management Science, doi.org/10.1287/
mnsc.2016.2638.
Demyanov VF, Rubinov AM (1995) Constructive Nonsmooth Analysis (Peterlang, Frankfurt
am Main).
Deng R, Yang Z, Chow MY, Chen J (2015) A survey on demand response in smart grids:
mathematical models and approaches. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics 11(3):
570-582.
Gao Y (2018) Nonsmooth Optimization (in Chinese), 2nd Edition (Science Press, Beijing).
Kantorovich LV (1965) The Best Use of Economic Resources (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge).
Kantorovich LV (1976) Mathematics in economics: achievements, difficulties, perspectives.
Mathematical Programming 11(1): 204-211.
Ke TT, Shen ZJM, Villas BJM (2016) Search for information on multiple products.
Management Science 62(12): 3576-3603.
Koopmans TC (1976) Concepts of optimality and their uses. Mathematical Programming 11(1):
212-228.
Lee CY, Zhou P (2015) Directional shadow price estimation of CO2, SO2 and NOx in the
United States coal power industry 1990-2010. European Journal of Operational Research 51:
493-502.
Nicholson W, Snyder C (2011) Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions
(Nelson Education, Canada).
